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I. Introduction
Duy Mai was just seventeen years old when a Washington state court involuntarily
institutionalized him.1 The court determined that Mai was mentally ill, dangerous, and in need of
mental health treatment after he made serious threats to himself and others.2 Following a ninemonth-long commitment, Mai was released from the treatment facility and has since lived a
“socially-responsible,” balanced life.3

He finished school, earned several degrees, gained

employment, and is now a father to two children.4

Fourteen years after his release, Mai

successfully petitioned a Washington state court to reinstate his right to possess a firearm—a right
that was restricted due to his involuntary commitment.5

Despite his success in state court,

however, on appeal the Ninth Circuit upheld the continued application of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4),
which prohibits firearm possession by any person “who has been adjudicated as a mental defective
or who has been committed to a mental institution.” 6 Consequently, federal law has effectively
banned Mai for life from possessing a firearm.7 Is this permanent deprivation of the right to
possess a firearm a violation of the Second Amendment as applied to individuals, like Mai, who
were involuntarily committed to a mental institution but have since been rehabilitated? The circuit
courts are currently split on this issue.8

* J.D. Candidate, 2022, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., Fordham University .
1 Mai v. United States, 952 F.3d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 2020).
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Mai, 952 F.3d at 1109; 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) (2018).
7 See Mai, 952 F.3d at 1110−12.
8 See id. at 1109; Beers v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 927 F.3d 150, 159 (3d Cir. 2019), vacated on other grounds, 140 S. Ct.
2758 (2020); Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678, 699 (6th Cir. 2016).
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Having clear gun control legislation is of paramount importance.

Gun violence,

particularly the increasing prevalence of mass shootings, is a constant subject of litigation and
policy debate in the United States. According to the Gun Violence Archives (“GVA”), the number
of mass shootings across the United States has steadily increased each year since 2014.9 In 2014,
the GVA reported 269 mass shootings.10 Just five years later, in 2019, it reported 417. 11 Similarly,
although less publicly announced, the numbers of suicides-by-gun reported are also rising.12 In
2014, the GVA reported 21,386 suicides-by-gun, and in 2018, it reported 24,432.13 These numbers
are striking, and in the aftermath of every tragedy are debates about gun control⎯an ongoing
struggle where the desire to preserve the Second Amendment and the desire to prevent more lives
from being lost to gun violence appear to be in tension with one another.14 Furthermore, the
discussion as to what relationship, if any, exists between mental illness and a tendency for gun
violence remains open.
At one extreme end of the policy debate is the belief that “[g]uns don’t kill people, the
mentally ill do.”15 And while this is, of course, a highly inflammatory assertion, it arguably echoes

9

The Gun Violence Archives was established in 2013 as a not-for-profit organization, which performs independent
research and collects and publishes gun violence data. The organization defines “mass shooting” based on a statistical
threshold of “[four] or more shot and/or killed in a single event [incident], at the same general time and location not
including
the
shooter.”
General
Methodology,
GUN
VIOLENCE
ARCHIVES,
https://www.gunviolencearchive.org/methodology (last visited May 11, 2021). But cf. Emily Wajert, Comment,
Navigating the Rights of the Mentally Ill and the Second Amendment: Defining Responsibility, Balancing Safety, and
Weighing Constitutional Rights, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 731, 739 (2017) (discussing the disparities in reports of gun
violence, which results, in part, from differing definitions of “mass shooting”).
10 GUN VIOLENCE ARCHIVES, https://www.gunviolencearchive.org (last visited May 11, 2021).
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 See, e.g., John Haltiwanger, Obama Faced Relentless Opposition to Gun Reform, Even After a Shooting That Left
20 Children Dead, BUSINESS I NSIDER (Aug. 6, 2019, 3:35 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/why -obama -facedrelentless-opposition-gun-reform-after-sandy-hook-2019-8; Arash Javanbakht, Mental Illness and Gun Laws: What
You May Not Know About the Complexities, THE CONVERSATION (February 26, 2018, 6:33 AM, updated March 1,
2018, 10:39 AM), https://theconversation.com/mental-illness-and-gun-laws-what-you-may-not-know-about-thecomplexities-92337 (quoting former President Donald Trump as saying, “I do not want mentally ill people to have
guns. Take the guns first, go through due process second”).
15 Ann Coulter, Guns Don’t Kill People, the Mentally Ill Do, ANNC OULTER.COM (Jan. 16, 2013),
https://anncoulter.com/2013/01/16/guns-dont-kill-people-the-mentally-ill-do.
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what many people have come to believe. For example, a 2019 study showed that approximately
eighty-three percent of people faulted the country’s mental health system for mass shootings.16 In
comparison, only sixty-nine percent faulted the accessibility of firearms.17 In fact, “[b]y a more
than 2-to-1 margin, more people say mass shootings reflect problems identifying and treating
people with mental health problems rather than inadequate gun control laws.” 18 Those on the
opposite side of the debate argue that mental illness has no significant correlation to gun violence.19
They also warn that further stigmatization of mental illness could be dangerous for an already
vulnerable group of people.20
Although the right is now commonly referred to as fundamental, the Supreme Court
refrained from acknowledging a personal right to possess a firearm until the early twenty-first
century, when it decided District of Columbia v. Heller.21 In Heller, the Court addressed the
Second Amendment’s scope and held that it the right to keep and bear arms is an individual right,
irrespective of military affiliation.22

Although its overall holding expanded the general

understanding of the Second Amendment’s application, the Court nevertheless described the
“longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill”23 as

16

Lydia Saad, More Blaming Extremism, Heated Rhetoric for Mass Shootings, GALLUP (Sept. 11, 2019),
https://news.gallup.com/poll/266750/blaming-extremism-heated-rhetoric-mass-shootings.aspx.
17 Id.
18 Peyton M. Craighill & Scott Clement, What Americans Blame Most for Mass Shootings (Hint: It’s Not Gun Laws),
WASH. Post (Oct. 26, 2015, 7:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/10/26/gun-controlamericans-overwhelmingly-blame-mental-health-failures-for-mass-shootings/.
19 See Editorial Board, Don’t Blame Mental Illness for Gun Violence, N.Y. TIMES, (Dec. 15, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/16/opinion/dont-blame-mental-illness-for-gun-violence.html (“Blaming mental
health problems for gun violence in America gives the public the false impression that most people with mental illness
are dangerous, when in fact a vast majority will never commit violence.”).
20 See Susan McMahon, Gun Laws and Mental Illness: Ridding the Statutes of Stigma , 5 U. PA. J. L & PUB. AFF. 1,
5−11 (2020).
21 554 U.S. 570 (2008). The most recent case preceding Heller was decided in 1939. United States v. Miller, 307
U.S. 174 (1939). In that case, Miller challenged the National Firearms Act of 1934’s regulation of the interstate
transport of certain firearms as violating the Second Amendment. Id. at 175–77. Rather than acknowledging an
individual right to possess a firearm, the court concluded that “[i]n the absence of any evidence tending to show that
possession or use of a [sawed-off] shotgun . . . has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a
well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an
instrument.” Id. at 178.
22 Heller, 554 U.S. at 595.
23 Id. at 626.
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“presumptively lawful.”24 In doing so, Heller left many open questions as to the applicability of
existing legislation and the standard under which courts should review future constitutional
challenges.
Part II of this Comment will provide background on (1) the Gun Control Act of 1968; (2)
the restrictions on firearm possession placed on certain classes of people, as enumerated in 18
U.S.C. § 922(g); and (3) the avenues of relief (or lack thereof) for individuals seeking to restore
their Second Amendment rights. Part III will discuss further the Supreme Court’s decision in
Heller and the resulting uncertainty in the lower courts. Part IV will analyze the current circuit
split regarding § 922(g)(4)’s permanent ban on firearm possession, particularly as applied to
individuals who, as a result of involuntary commitment, have lost their rights. Part V of this
Comment will then urge the Supreme Court to provide uniform guidance and suggest that it adopt
the reasoning set forth by the Ninth Circuit in Mai v. United States.25
II. Legislative Limitations to the Second Amendment
The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “A well regulated
Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear
Arms, shall not be infringed.”26

Although an individual right to possess firearms was not

affirmatively recognized by the Supreme Court until 2008,27 extensive federal gun control
legislation emerged in the early twentieth century when Congress first passed the National Firearm
Act of 1934,28 “which established a stringent taxation and registration scheme for specified
weapons associated with the Prohibition-fueled gang violence of the time.”29 Since then, Congress

24

Id. at 627 n.26.
952 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2020).
26 U.S. C ONST . amend. II.
27 See generally Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (addressing whether prohibiting individual possession of handguns violated the
Second Amendment).
28 National Firearms Act, Publ. L. 73−474, 48 Stat. 1236 (1934).
29 M ICHAEL A. FOSTER & SARAH H ERMAN PECK, C ONG. R ESEARCH SERV., R45629, FEDERAL FIREARMS LAWS:
OVERVIEW AND SELECTED LEGAL I SSUES 2 (2019), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45629.
25
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has passed related legislation including, most notably to this Comment, the Gun Control Act of
1968.30 And as such legislation continues to increase, so do restrictions on the rights guaranteed
by the Second Amendment. This Part will first discuss the background of the Gun Control Act of
1968 and the restrictions imposed on the right to firearm possession, as enumerated in 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g). Then, this Part will explore the paths through which individuals can petition to have
their rights restored once lost.
A. The Gun Control Act of 1968
Over thirty years after Congress passed its first wide-spanning piece of gun control
legislation, the National Firearm Act of 1934, it had to act once again in response to growing rates
of violence and civil unrest in the 1960s.31 During that period, the increasing number of urban
riots and protests led to increased fear of gun violence; and increased fear of gun violence led to
“increased demand for firearms as instruments of self-defense.”32

The rate of homicides

committed with handguns increased substantially and steadily, as did the interstate flow of
firearms.33 And while the assassinations of President John F. Kennedy and Dr. Martin Luther King
Junior certainly expedited passage of the Gun Control Act of 1968,34 its highly likely that Congress
was responding primarily to racial bias and a growing fear that Black people would arm themselves
in their fight for civil rights.35
The Gun Control Act of 1968 (“the Act”) was established to serve three main purposes: (1)
to regulate the movement of firearms within interstate commerce, (2) “to regulate the importation

30

Gun Control Act of 1968, Publ. L. No. 90−168, 76 Stat. 111 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921−931 (2018).
Nash E. Gilmore, Article, A Bridge Over Troubled Water: The Second Amendment Guarantee for the Previously
Mentally Institutionalized, 86 M ISS. L. J. SUPRA 1, 13 (2017).
32 Franklin E. Zimring, Firearms and Federal Law: The Gun Control Act of 1968 , 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 133, 148 (1975).
33 See id. (providing the example that “[i]n 1965 Detroit experience a total of 140 homicides; 55 of these, or 39 per
cent, were committed with guns. Three years later 72 percent of Detroit’s 389 killings were committed with guns”).
34 Gilmore, supra note 3131, at 13.
35 Stefan B. Tahmassebi, Gun Control and Racism, 2 GEO. M ASON U. C.R. L.J. 67, 80 (1991) (quoting R OBERT
SHERRIL, THE SATURDAY NIGHT SPECIAL 280 (1972)) (“In his book The Saturday, Night Special, anti-gun journalist
Robert Sherrill frankly admitted that the Gun Control Act of 1968 was ‘passed not to control guns but to control
Blacks.’”).
31
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of firearms into the United States,” and (3) to restrict firearm possession from certain classes of
individuals.36 Since 1968, Congress has amended the Act on numerous occasions with intervening
legislation, including the Firearm Owner’s Protection Act of 1986 and the Brady Handgun
Violence Protection Act of 1993, through which the National Instant Criminal Background Check
System was created (hereinafter “NICS”).37 The Act now represents a complex statutory regime
rather than a single statute.38
In furtherance of the Act’s third purpose⎯to regulate who can (and cannot) possess
firearms⎯Congress carved out categories of prohibited persons and enumerated the list in 18
U.S.C. § 922(g).39 The list includes convicted felons, fugitives, habitual substance abusers, illegal
immigrants, and individuals who are, or have been, dishonorably discharged from the military, the
subject of a restraining order, or domestic-violence misdemeanants.40

Most relevant to this

Comment, § 922(g)(4) restricts persons “who [have] been adjudicated as a mental defective or
[have] been committed to a mental institution,” from possessing firearms. 41 Although the Act does
not define “commitment to a mental institution,” federal regulation has interpreted the phrase to
mean a “formal commitment of a person to a mental institution by a court, board, commission, or
other lawful authority.”42

It is intended only to encompass involuntary commitment, not

commitment “for observation or a voluntary admission.” 43 Accordingly, federal regulation has
extended the term “adjudicated” to both the former and latter clause of § 922(g)(4). Individuals

36

Id. at 13−14.
Foster & Peck, supra note 29.
38 Id. at 6.
39 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2018).
40 Id.
41 Id. § 922(g)(4).
42 27 C.F.R. § 478.11.
43 Id.; see also United States v. Rehlander, 666 F.3d 45, 50 (1st Cir. 2012) (“[A] temporary hospitalization under
section 3863 does not constitute a ‘commitment’ under section 922.”); United States v. Hansel, 474 F.2d 1120, 1123
(8th Cir. 1973) (“There is nothing in 18 U.S.C. § 922(h) [now § 922(g)] which indicates an intent to prohibit the
possession of firearms by persons who had been hospitalized for observation and examination, where they were found
not to be mentally ill. The statute makes it clear that a commitment is required.”).
37
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restricted from firearm possession under this provision lose their rights only after their case has
been heard by an appropriate judicial authority that determines the individuals are a danger to
themselves or others.
B. Seeking Relief: Federal Law’s Catch-22
In addition to setting forth categorical prohibitions on firearm possession, the Act also
provides a federal relief-from-disabilities program, codified in 18 U.S.C. § 925(c).44 This section
of the Act provides that an individual barred from possessing firearms under any provision of §
922(g) may seek reinstatement of his rights from the Attorney General.45 The Attorney General
is empowered to grant such relief upon a showing “that the circumstances regarding the disability,
and the applicant’s record and reputation, are such that the applicant will not be likely to act in a
manner dangerous to public safety and that the granting of relief would not be contrary to the
public interest.”46 The Attorney General’s power is completely discretionary and he may deny
relief even when all of the elements are otherwise satisfied.47 In that case, the applicant may file
a petition with the United States District Court for judicial review. 48 Yet Congress defunded the
program in 1992, so, unfortunately for those seeking federal relief, § 925(c) is now a nullity.49
Congress decided to defund the program due to its highly subjective nature, stating that the
application review process was too difficult of a task to undertake, especially when the result could
be a devastating loss for the applicant.50
About fifteen years after § 925(c) was defunded, Congress enacted the NICS Improvement
Amendments Act of 2007 in an attempt to “encourage the states to supply accurate and up-to-date

44

18 U.S.C. § 925(c).
Id.
46 Id.
47 See United States v. Bean, 537 U.S. 71, 76 (2002).
48 Id. at 76−77.
49 Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678, 682 (6th Cir. 2016).
50 Id.
45
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information to deferral firearm databases,” through the issuance of federal grants. 51 Congress
conditioned these grants on a state creating a relief-from-disabilities program through which
individuals, restricted from firearm possession under § 922(g)(4), could petition to the state for the
restoration of their rights.52 In order to grant relief, a “State court, board, commission, or other
lawful authority” must determine that the applicant’s record and reputation show that he or she
“will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety and that the granting of relief
would not be contrary to public interest.”53 Because § 925(c) is null, this is the only avenue by
which such relief can be granted. Currently, approximately thirty states have a qualifying
program.54
III. The Second Amendment’s Scope as Defined by the Supreme Court
During most of American history, there was a widespread belief that Second Amendment
protections applied only in the context of militia service. 55 This was largely a result of the Supreme
Court’s 1939 holding in United States v. Miller.56 In that case, the Court declined to interpret the
Second Amendment as protecting an individual’s possession of a specific shotgun—which was
otherwise in violation of the National Firearms Act of 1934—because the shotgun was not
“ordinary military equipment,” and it was not being used to “contribute to the common defense.” 57
But after almost eight decades of silence, the Court in 2008 revisited this issue in District of

51

Id.; NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007, Publ. L. No. 1110−1180, 121 Stat. 2559 (2008).
Tyler, 837 F.3d at 682. This provision was codified in 34 U.S.C. § 40915 (2018), which “permits a person, who
pursuant to State law, has been adjudicates as described in [§ 922(g)(4)], or has been comm itted to a mental institution,
to apply to the state for relief.” Note that while § 925(c) provided an avenue for relief for all persons barred under
any provision of § 922(g), § 40915 only provides relief for those barred specifically by § 922(g)(4). Id. at 682 n.1.
53 34 U.S.C. § 40915.
54 Mai v. United States, 952 F.3d 1106, 1112 (9th Cir. 2020); see also State Profiles: NICS Act Record Improvement
Program
(NARIP)
Awards
FY
2009–2018,
BUREAU
OF
JUSTICE
STATISTICS,
https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=491 (last visited Feb. 18, 2021) (including the Tulalip Tribe of Washington
as the thirty-first state to have a program).
55 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 577 (2008).
56 307 U.S. 174 (1939)
57 Id. at 175−78.
52
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Columbia v. Heller.58 This Part will first broadly discuss Heller’s holding. Then it will address
the questions that the Court left unresolved.
A. District of Columbia v. Heller
In Heller, the Supreme Court reviewed a District of Columbia regulation that generally
prohibited the individual registration and possession of handguns.59 In doing so, it addressed the
question of whether the Second Amendment right to “keep and bear arms” was limited to the
context of service in the militia.60 Answering in the negative, the Court held that the Second
Amendment guarantees an individual right to possess and use firearms for traditionally lawful
purposes; it is not limited to those that are connected to the militia.61 It also determined that the
protected class at the core of the Second Amendment was intended to be “law-abiding, responsible
citizens.”62 Yet, despite broadly interpreting the Second Amendment to expand its application,
the Court cautioned that the rights conferred by the Second Amendment are not unlimited, drawing
an analogy to the parameters of the First Amendment. 63 Further, the Court made explicit that
“noting in [its] opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the
possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill.”64 It even referred to such regulations as
“presumptively lawful.”65 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, gave an extensive historical
account of the Second Amendment and its implications in the case at hand; however, the Court’s
decision was narrow in scope and did not provide a clear legal framework for future challenges.
B. Heller’s Unsettled Principles

58

554 U.S. 570 (2008).
Id. at 573−76.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 581, 589.
62 Id. at 635.
63 Id. at 595 (“[W]e do not read the Second Amendment to protect the right of citizens to carry arms for any sort of
confrontation, just as we do not read the First Amendment to protect the right of citizens to speak for any purpose.”).
64 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626.
65 Id. at 627 n.26.
59
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One of the most surprising aspects of Heller’s opinion was the Court’s refusal to “establish
a level of scrutiny for Second Amendment restrictions.” 66 The Court justified this decision simply
because Heller was its first in-depth analysis of the Second Amendment, and thus some remaining
areas of uncertainty were to be expected.67 Nonetheless, while a uniform approach has yet to be
established by the Supreme Court, there seems to be a general consensus among the lower courts
that the restrictions enumerated in § 922(g) should be analyzed using intermediate scrutiny. 68
In order to withstand constitutional muster under intermediate scrutiny, the challenged law
“must be substantially related to an important governmental interest.” 69 This standard of review
calls for a greater showing than rational basis review, which requires only that a challenged law
“be rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose,” 70 yet it is not quite as rigorous as
strict scrutiny, which requires that the law “furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored
to achieve that interest.”71 Under intermediate scrutiny, the government need not show that the
challenged law is the least restrictive way to further its “important” interest, but it must show that
it is at least a reasonable fit.72 Because of the general consensus among the lower courts that
intermediate scrutiny should apply to challenges against § 922(g) restrictions, any disagreement
as to the application of an alternative level of scrutiny is outside the scope of this Comment.
Instead, this Comment will use intermediate scrutiny to approach any analysis.

66

Id. at 634−35 (declining to adopt one of the traditional standards, such as strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny or a
rational basis review, and explicitly rejecting an “interest-balancing inquiry”).
67 Id. at 635.
68 See Mai v. United States, 952 F.3d 1106, 1109 (2020) (applying intermediate scrutiny to § 922(g)(4)); Tyler v.
Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678, 690−92 (6th Cir. 2016) (applying intermediate scrutiny to § 922(g)(4));
see also United States v. Chova n, 735 F.3d 1127, 1137−38 (9th Cir. 2013) (applying intermediate scrutiny to §
922(g)(9), which prohibits firearm possession by convicted domestic violence misdemeanant); United States v. Carter,
669 F.3d 411, 417 (4th Cir. 2012) (applying intermediate scrutiny to § 922(g)(3), which prohibits firearm possession
by habitual substance abusers); United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685, 692 (7th Cir. 2010) (applying intermediate
scrutiny to § 922(g)(1), which prohibits firearm possession by convicted felons).
69 Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1998).
70 Id.
71 FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007).
72 United States v. Skoien, 587 F.3d 803, 805−06 (7th Cir. 2009).

10

The Heller Court also left unsettled the question of whether its discussion of the Second
Amendment’s “long-standing prohibitions” on the mentally ill was simply dicta, or if it intended
to foreclose any challenges to § 922(g)(4) by referring the prohibitions as “presumptively
lawful”.73 In 2010, the Court had the chance to revisit this issue in McDonald v. City of Chicago,
another case in which petitioners challenged a state-issued handgun ban.74 In McDonald, the Court
affirmed its holding in Heller⎯that the Second Amendment protects an individual right⎯and also
restated Heller’s proposition that “[its] holding did not cast doubt on longstanding regulatory
measure.”75 Despite this reiteration, it still seems unclear to what extent § 922(g)(4) is shielded
from any constitutional scrutiny. Confusion is exacerbated by the ambiguity in the Heller Court’s
use of the phrase “the mentally ill.”76 Most notably, the Court uses language that is, on its face, in
the present tense. This has raised speculation as to whether the Court intended to include only
individuals who are currently mentally ill and, therefore, leave open the possibility that such
restriction could be lifted once a person regains his or her mental health.77
IV. The Split
Over a decade after the Supreme Court issued its decision in District of Columbia v. Heller,
lower courts have yet to adopt a uniform approach for addressing challenges to Second
Amendment restrictions. Furthermore, despite most courts adopting intermediate scrutiny as the
appropriate standard of review,78 its application is seemingly inconsistent. As a result, an

73

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, at 626, 627 n.26. (2008 )
561 U.S. 742 (2010).
75 Id. at 786.
76 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626.
77 See Mai v. United States, 952 F.3d 1106, 1114 (9th Cir. 2020).
78 See id. at 1109 (applying intermediate scrutiny to § 922(g)(4)); Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d
678, 690−92 (6th Cir. 2016) (applying intermediate scrutiny to § 922(g)(4)); see also United States v. Chovan, 735
F.3d 1127, 1137− 38 (9th Cir. 2013) (applying intermediate scrutiny to § 922(g)(9), which prohibits firearm possession
by convicted domestic violence misdemeanant); United States v. Carter, 669 F.3d 411, 417, (4th Cir. 2012) (applying
intermediate scrutiny to § 922(g)(3), which prohibits firearm possession by habitual substance abusers); United States
v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685, 692 (7th Cir. 2010) (applying intermediate scrutiny to § 922(g)(1), which prohibits firearm
possession by convicted felons).
74
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individual’s chance for relief from § 922(g)(4) is heavily dependent on the jurisdiction he or she
brings the claim. This section explores the circuit split between the Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits
in order to illustrate the different ways in which intermediate scrutiny and Heller have been
applied.
A. Tyler v. Hillsdale County Sherriff’s Department
In January 1986, Michigan’s Hillsdale County Probate Court determined that Clifford
Tyler was mentally ill and dangerous.79

When Tyler first came before the court, he was

“emotionally devastated” as a result of his recent separation from his wife of twenty-three years.80
Tyler’s daughters contacted the local police because they feared that Tyler would harm himself ;
the court agreed.81 The probate court involuntarily committed Tyler and he remained at the
treatment center for approximately two to four weeks. 82 Subsequent to his release, Tyler never
received any follow-up therapy and has lived a generally healthy life.83 He also remarried and has
maintained a good relationship with his daughters. 84 In 2011, Tyler sought to purchase a firearm
but was denied as a result of his involuntary commitment.85 In an attempt to have his rights
restored, Tyler “underwent both a substance-abuse and a psychological evaluation.”86 The doctor
concluded that, although Tyler likely suffered a depressive episode thirty-six years earlier, he was
no longer mentally ill.87

Nonetheless, the state of Michigan has not created a relief-from-

disabilities program, making Tyler ineligible to apply for relief under 34 U.S.C § 40915.88

79

Tyler, 837 F.3d at 683.
Id.
81 Id.
82 Id. (noting also that Tyler declined medication for the entire period of his commitment).
83 Id. at 683−84.
84 Id.
85 Tyler, 837 F.3d at 684.
86 Id. at 683.
87 Id. at 684.
88 Id. at 683.
80
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After reviewing Tyler’s case, the Sixth Circuit determined that the Supreme Court’s
categorization of the “long standing prohibitions” on the mentally ill as “presumptively lawful” in
Heller did not insulate § 922(g)(4) from constitutional scrutiny.89 Accordingly, the court adopted
a two-step analysis generally accepted to resolve Second Amendment challenges. 90 Under this
analysis, the court first looks at “whether the challenged law burdens conduct that falls within the
scope of the Second Amendment right, as historically understood.”91 If it does not, then the inquiry
is over.92 If it does, however, then the court must determine the appropriate level of scrutiny with
which to review the law and examine “the strength of the government’s justification for restricting
or regulating the exercise of the Second Amendment.” 93
1. Does § 922(G)(4) Burden Second Amendment Conduct?
The Sixth Circuit began by addressing whether Heller, on its own, resolved the first step
of the analysis considering that the Supreme Court categorized prohibitions on mentally ill persons
as “presumptively lawful.”94 The court held it did not.95 As interpreted by the Sixth Circuit, the
word “presumptively” does not conclusively foreclose an as-applied challenge to Second
Amendment restrictions because such language is “precautionary, not preclusive.”96
The court then looked at the historical basis for restricting firearm possession from persons
who were mentally ill, which the Heller Court referred to as “longstanding.”97 Unlike the Heller
Court, however, the Sixth Circuit determined that any historical basis for such a restriction was

89

Id. at 681.
Id. at 685; see also United States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 538 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Marzzarella, 614
F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 800 −801 (10th Cir. 2010) (adopting the same twostep analysis).
91 Tyler, 837 F.3d at 686 (quoting Greeno, 679 F.3d at 518).
92 Id.
93 Id. (quoting Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 683, 703 (7th Cir. 2011)).
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 686−87.
97 Tyler, 837 F.3d at 687 (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008 )).
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lacking, particularly considering that § 922(g)(4) was not enacted until 1968. 98 Moreover, it
pointed out that while the Heller Court adopted the phrase “the mentally ill,” § 922(g)(4) does not
utilize the same language.99 In contrast, § 922(g)(4) is particularly limited to people who have
been “adjudicated” as a “mental defective” or who have been committed to a mental institution—
“adjudicated” being the operative word.100 Making clear that it would not subscribe to the notion
of “[o]nce mentally ill, always so,” the Sixth Circuit ruled that the government must provide further
proof that the petitioner was still mentally ill and dangerous.101 Accordingly, the court determined
that the government failed to meet its burden to prove that people previously involuntary
committed for mental health treatment categorically fall outside of the scope of the Second
Amendment.102
2. Can § 922(g)(4) Withstand Constitutional Scrutiny?
The second step of the court’s two-step analysis requires the court, first, to determine what
level of scrutiny should be applied, and second, to determine whether the challenged law
withstands such scrutiny.103

Like many other circuits, the Sixth Circuit determined that

intermediate scrutiny was the appropriate standard of scrutiny to apply because “[t]o hold . . . that
[Tyler] is at the core of the Second Amendment despite his history of mental illness would cut too
hard against Congress’s power to categorically prohibit certain presumptively dangerous people
from gun ownership.”104 It also found that even though the burden of a permanent ban on firearm
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analyzed the claim under strict scrutiny; however, when the case came before it again in 2016, the court determined
99

14

possession is a substantial one on Tyler individually, the burden is quite narrow overall because it
only applies to a small subset of the population⎯those who have been involuntarily
institutionalized or adjudicated as “mentally defective.” 105 Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit analyzed
the challenged law under intermediate scrutiny.
The court first asked whether the government had put forth an important interest. 106 In
addition to the general objective of § 922(g)(4), which is to keep firearms out of the hands of
people who are considered to potentially be dangerous, the court also considered two other
objectives: (1) to reduce gun-related violence and crime and (2) to prevent suicides-by-gun.107
According to the Sixth Circuit, those interests were “not only legitimate, they [were]
compelling.”108

The issue was, however, determining how closely § 922(g)(4) served those

interests.
To prove its case, the government pointed to two recent mass shootings, both of which
were perpetrated by individuals who were mentally ill and had recently been involuntarily
committed.109 The Sixth Circuit ruled that evidence was not sufficiently related to Tyler’s case
because Tyler’s involuntary commitment occurred years ago and he has since been evaluated as
not having a mental illness.110 It then considered an empirical study put forth by the government,
which found the risk for suicide to be thirty-nine times higher for people who have been previously
committed than not.111 The court, however, did not place great weight on this study either because
it spanned a period fewer than two years; therefore, it did not reasonably explain why a lifelong
that intermediate scrutiny was the more appropriate standard. See generally Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t,
775 F.3d 308 (2014) (applying strict scrutiny).
105 Tyler, 837 F.3d at 691.
106 Id. at 693.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 694−95 (referring to the Virginia Tech shooting and a subsequent shooting in New York).
110 Id. at 695.
111 Tyler, 837 F.3d at 695−96; see also E. Clare Harris & Brian Barraclough, Suicide as an Outcome for Mental Illness:
A Meta-Analysis, 170 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 205, 223 (1997) (noting also that the risk for suicide is greater closer to
the time an individual is released from commitment; the risk diminishes thereafter).

15

ban was necessary to achieve the government’s objectives as-applied to individuals like Tyler,
who were committed decades ago.112 Next, the government presented evidence that Connecticut
saw a fifty-three-percent decrease in violent crimes perpetrated by people with prior commitments
after the state began preventing those individuals from purchasing firearms. 113 But the court
determined that the study merely showed that restricting access to guns reduces gun violence; it
did not “meaningfully compare previously committed individual’s propensity for violence with
that of the general population.114
In comparison, Tyler presented a study, which concluded that “when controlling for
substance abuse problems, the rates of violent acts perpetrated by involuntary committed patients
and the general population in one community in Pittsburgh was ‘statistically indistinguishable.’” 115
Lastly, the court pointed to the creation of § 925(c), and later § 40915, as evidence in and of itself
that Congress intended for individuals to have an avenue for relief under § 922(g)(4).116
Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit held that the government was currently unable to overcome
its burden of proving that a lifelong ban on firearm possession was substantially related to
government interests as applied to Tyler’s case. 117 It then remanded the case to the district court
for decision and cautioned that in order to justify § 922(g)(4), the government either had to prove
to the district court that the ban was constitutional as-applied to Tyler because he would be a danger
to himself or others, or it had to offer more evidence to support the statute’s categorical, permanent
ban.118
B. Beers v. Attorney General United States
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Three years following Tyler, the Third Circuit addressed an almost identical issue in Beers
v. Attorney General United States.119 Plaintiff Bradley Beers was involuntarily committed for
mental health treatment in 2005 after “he told his mother that he was suicidal and put a gun in his
mouth.”120 He was first committed for up to 120 hours, but his commitment was extended by a
Pennsylvania state court twice after it determined Beers was “severely mentally disabled and in
need of treatment.”121 Shortly after his commitment, Beers attempted to purchase a firearm but
was denied after notice of his involuntary commitment appeared on the NICS background
check.122 Beers has not received further mental health treatment subsequent to being released in
2006.123 Additionally, in 2013, a physician examined Beers and reported that he would be able to
“safely handle firearms again without risk of harm to himself or others.”124
The Third Circuit departed from the two-prong framework for Second Amendment
challenges adopted in Tyler and placed the burden of proof more heavily on Beers rather than the
government.125 First, the court looked at the justifications for barring the prohibited class from
Second Amendment protections.126 Then, it asked whether Beers could distinguish himself from
those persons.127 It determined that only if Beers could distinguish himself would the burden shift
to the government to show that the challenged law could survive heightened scrutiny.128
Unlike the Tyler Court, the Third Circuit never scrutinized § 922(g)(4) because it
determined that Beers was outside of the class of persons historically protected by the Second
Amendment.129 Although it conceded that there is little historical evidence of specifically
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prohibiting the mentally ill from possessing firearms, the court maintained that this was only
because such laws were not necessary in the eighteenth-century.130 For example, it considered the
fact that in the eighteenth century, courts had the authority to incarcerate people it considered
insane.131 Accordingly, the court found that “the traditional justification for disarming mentally
ill individuals was that they were considered dangerous to themselves and/or to the public at large,”
and that there was sufficient historical evidence to support the ban, even if it was sparse.132
Furthermore, the Third Circuit determined that Beers would be unable to distinguish himself from
the traditionally prohibited class because his case rested on the substantial passage of time between
his involuntary commitment and rehabilitation.133 It explained that “neither the passage of time
nor evidence of rehabilitation ‘can restore Second Amendment rights that were forfeited,’” because
there is no historical evidence to support the contrary. 134 According to the court, the only way for
Beers to completely remove himself from the prohibited class was to show that he was in fact
never adjudicated as a danger to himself or others⎯an obviously impossible burden.135 The Third
Circuit, therefore, upheld the categorical restriction imposed by § 922(g)(4). 136
C. Mai v. United States
Shortly after Beers, the Ninth Circuit also addressed an as-applied challenge to §
922(g)(4)’s lifelong ban in Mai v. United States.137 In that case, seventeen-year-old Duy Mai was
involuntarily committed to a mental institution by a Washington state court after he threatened to
hurt himself and others and the court found that he was mentally ill and dangerous. 138 Mai was
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released from the mental health facility at age eighteen, after only nine months of treatment , and
has since lived a “socially-responsible” and balanced life.139 Fourteen years following his release,
Mai attempted to purchase a firearm but was denied as a result of his prior involuntary
commitment.140 Even though Mai qualified under Washington’s state relief-from-disabilities
program, the federal court determined that the state’s program itself did not qualify under 34
U.S.C. § 40915 because it was significantly less stringent.141 Particularly the court pointed out
that Washington’s statute lacks a requisite finding that “relief would not be contrary to the public
interest,” which is present in § 40915.142 As a result, Mai brought suit and argued that, as applied
to him, § 922(g)(4) was unconstitutional.143
In deciding Mai’s case, the Ninth Circuit applied the same two-step analysis for challenges
to Second Amendment restrictions as was applied by the Sixth Circuit ⎯ first asking whether the
burdened conduct is within the scope of the Second Amendment, and then determining whether
the challenged law withstands the appropriate level of scrutiny.144 Diverging from the Sixth
Circuit and the Third Circuit, however, the Mai Court essentially refrained from any historical
analysis and “assume[d], without deciding, that § 922(g)(4), as applied to Plaintiff, burden[ed]
Second Amendment rights.”145
In addressing the second step of the analysis, the court agreed with the Sixth Circuit that
intermediate scrutiny was the correct standard to apply. 146 The court came to this conclusion for
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two reasons. First, it determined that Mai, like others who had been previously involuntarily
committed, fell outside of the core class of persons protected by the Second Amendment⎯lawabiding, responsible citizens.147 Second, it determined that § 922(g)(4) burdened only a narrow
class, even if its effects were substantial on Mai individually. 148 The Ninth Circuit, however,
differed in its application of intermediate scrutiny. Like the Tyler Court, it found the government’s
interests of preventing suicide and reducing crime to be serious and compelling; however, unlike
the Tyler Court, the Ninth Circuit found that § 922(g)(4) was sufficiently related to those
interests.149
To prove its case, the government presented the same case study as it did in Tyler, which
concluded that the risk of suicide is thirty-nine percent higher for individuals who have been
involuntarily committed.150 The court, however, disagreed with the Sixth Circuit and determined
that the study provided sufficient justification to support Congress’s finding that § 922(g)(4)’s
restrictions would be a reasonable solution.151 Even though the research presented studied a
maximum time period of eight-and-a-half years, and Mai was discharged from hospitalization two
decades ago, the court determined that this was irrelevant to its analysis because, under
intermediate scrutiny, it need not impose an unnecessarily rigorous burden on the government.152
The court reiterated that the government did not need to present the court with evidence that
perfectly matched the facts of Mai’s case; it just needed to present enough evidence to reasonably
connect its important interest to the challenged law.153 And in cases like the one at hand, where
empirical evidence is incomplete overall, deference should be given to Congress to make
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predictive judgments and implement the law accordingly.154 According to the Ninth Circuit,
“[t]hat standard applied because ‘we are weighing a legislative judgment, not evidence in a
criminal trial.”155 The court then contended that it did not need to scrutinize § 922(g)(4) in relation
to the government’s other interests, such as reducing crime, because it found a reasonable fit
between § 922(g)(4) and the stated objective of reducing suicide rates156
Lastly, the court held that the creation of § 40915 could not be used to infer congressional
intent because it was an “extension of grace to some persons as a part of a political compromise,”
which will not affect a constitutional analysis. 157 Even considering the lack of relief programs
available to Mai, the Ninth Circuit still found that the other factors discussed outweighed this
limitation and justified the categorical enforcement of § 922(g)(4) because the Second Amendment
does not require individualized hearings for personal risk assessment.158
D. Summarizing the Split
In assessing § 922(g)(4)’s constitutionality, the Third Circuit began its analysis by asking
what the traditional justifications for barring individuals previously involuntarily committed from
firearm possession and whether the petitioner could distinguish himself from that class. 159 By
framing the first inquiry in this way the court ended its analysis before scrutinizing § 922(g)(4)
because it quickly determined that the only way petitioner could distinguish himself from the
restricted class was to show that he in fact had not been involuntarily committed.160 In contrast,
the Sixth and Ninth Circuit began by addressing the question of whether the statute burdens Second
Amendment rights.161 To do this, both courts followed a nearly identical two-step test, asking (1)
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whether the prohibited conduct falls within the protections of the Second Amendment, and if so,
(2) whether the law can withstand constitutional scrutiny. 162 In addressing the first step, the Sixth
Circuit did a full analysis of the historical support for its finding that Second Amend ment
guarantees were burdened.163 In contrast, the Ninth Circuit so assumed without deciding. 164
Finally, both the Sixth and Ninth Circuits adopted intermediate scrutiny to analyze § 922(g) but
the courts diverged on their findings and overall outcomes.165
V. Addressing the Split
The Supreme Court has recognized the Second Amendment as being “deeply rooted in this
Nation’s history and tradition.”166 It protects a constitutional right that is heavily exercised and
valued across the United States. Resolution by the Court on the aforementioned circuit split is
necessary in order to establish uniform policy and expectations.

By examining different

justifications for categorically upholding § 922(g)(4), this Part suggests that the Ninth Circuit
correctly applied intermediate scrutiny to the challenged law in Mai v. United States,167 and it
proposes that the Supreme Court should adopt a similar analysis.
A. Defining the Protected Class
In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court established that the Second
Amendment was intended to protect “law-abiding, responsible citizens.”168 Individuals restricted
from possessing a firearm as a result of involuntary institutionalization under § 922(g)(4) do not
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fall within that class. Plaintiffs in the above-mentioned cases all argued that they have been
rehabilitated from their mental illnesses and offered proof that they live balanced and peaceful
lives. Yet even accepting that the plaintiffs are presently responsible citizens, this should not
automatically place them back within the Second Amendment’s protected class.

Individuals

restricted by § 922(g)(4) as a result of involuntary commitment required formal intervention, they
were afforded due process, and a court determined that they were a danger to themselves or others.
As a result, they can no longer fit into the category of “responsible” citizens.
This approach is consistent with that taken by the courts when considering other § 922(g)
restrictions. For example, in United States v. Chovan, the Ninth Circuit considered an as-applied
challenge to § 922(g)(9), which “prohibits persons convicted of domestic violence misdemeanors
from possessing firearms for life.”169 The court concluded that, despite present-day peacefulness
and notwithstanding the passage of time since conviction, domestic violence misdemeanants were
not “law-abiding” citizens such that § 922(g)(9) would implicate the core Second Amendment
guarantee.170 Similarly, in Hamilton v. Pallozi, the Fourth Circuit upheld the permanent ban on
firearm possession that § 922(g)(1) imposes on felons.171 In that case, the plaintiff was convicted
of three non-violent state felonies—credit card fraud, credit card theft, and credit card forgery—
and was sentenced to four years in prison.”172 The Fourth Circuit held that “a felon cannot be
returned to the category of ‘law-abiding, responsible citizens’ for the purposes of the Second
Amendment,” leaving open only the narrow exceptions of a pardon or the law underlying the
conviction being held unconstitutional.173 Furthermore, the court refused to consider evidence of

169

735 F.3d 1127, 1129 (9th Cir. 2013).
Id. at 1138.
171 848 F.3d 617, 629 (4th Cir. 2017); accord United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768, 771 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam)
(“[Heller’s] language suggests that statues disqualifying felons from possessing a firearm under any and all
circumstances do not offend the Second Amendment.”).
172 Pallozi, 848 F.3d at 618.
173 Id. at 626, 629.
170

23

rehabilitation or the passage of time in issuing its decision. 174 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit
soundly applied this reasoning to petitioner Duy Mai’s case. Once adjudicated as mentally ill and
dangerous, and committed for mental health treatment, Mai was removed from the class of
“responsible” citizens that is at the core of the Second Amendment.
Arguably, § 922(g)(4) can be broken up into two prongs—first addressing individuals
adjudicated as mentally ill and second addressing individuals previously involuntarily
institutionalized. Individuals like Mai may be able to persuade a court that they have since been
rehabilitated and are no longer mentally ill, but that does not remove the fact that they still fit the
second prong. This reasoning is analogous to that in Chovan and Hamilton. Just because the
petitioner in Chovan was no longer dangerous, does not erase the fact that he once was. And in
Hamilton, even where the petitioner was not convicted of a traditionally “dangerous” crime, the
prior adjudication still acted as a bar from firearm possession.
B. Historical Evidence of Second Amendment Restrictions
Historical evidence is an important factor when considering whether a challenged statute
infringes on Second Amendment rights. “A law does not burden Second Amendment rights if it
‘regulates conduct that historically has fallen outside the scope of the Second Amendment.’” 175
Federal prohibitions on firearm possession by those who are adjudicated as mentally ill or
previously involuntarily committed are undeniably twentieth-century creations; § 922(g)(4) itself
was not enacted until 1968.176 Nonetheless, there are reasons to believe that analogous restrictions
were imposed throughout history in a less formal manner. For example, “[i]n eighteenth-century
America, justices of the peace were authorized to ‘lock up’ ‘lunatics’ who were ‘dangerous to be
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permitted to go abroad.’”177

Accordingly, it has been suggested that “[i]f this significant

infringement of liberty was permissible, then the lesser step of mere disarmament would likely be
permissible as well.”178 Furthermore, stepping out of the confines of mental illness, historically
and “at a higher level of generality . . . any person viewed as potentially dangerous could be
disarmed by the government without running afoul of the ‘right to bear arms.’”179
Nevertheless, evidence rooting § 922(g)(4)’s restriction in history is limited at best, and
does not seem to be enough to support a categorical, permanent ban on a constitutional
guarantee.180 When an individual loses his Second Amendment rights he loses, in large part, the
ability to protect himself, his family, and his property. The Third Circuit’s acceptance of this
evidence as conclusive without analyzing § 922(g)(4) under any form of heightened scrutiny takes
too narrow of a view. On the other hand, an argument can be made that such pervasive gun
violence is also largely a creation of the twentieth century, and, therefore Congress should be able
to pass legislation that addresses current needs. The Ninth Circuit’s analysis in Mai took a prudent
approach and “assume[d], without deciding, that § 922(g)(4) as applied to [the petitioner],
burden[ed] Second Amendment rights.”181 In doing so, the court properly placed the burden on
the government to prove that the law was justified and could survive constitutional scrutiny
without totally discrediting the limited historical evidence presented.
C. Empirical Evidence Supporting an Important Governmental Interest
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In both Mai and Tyler, the government offered empirical studies that discussed the
relationship between mental illness and the propensity for suicide. In Mai, the Ninth Circuit
correctly concluded that these studies provided a sufficient amount of evidence to support a
congressional finding that intervening legislation was necessary. Despite the Sixth Circuit in Tyler
focusing more on the relationship between mental illness and violence, reducing suicide rates is
just as important of an interest as reducing crime rates. 182 When a person commits suicide, the
tragedy affects not only the decedent but also his or her family and friends, and the community at
large.183 Accordingly, “[e]ven a small decrease in the number of suicides is a public benefit.”184
Furthermore, the connection between mental illness and the propensity for suicide is not
insignificant. A 2003 study, which utilized the psychological autopsy method 185 to explain reasons
why individuals committed suicide, concluded that “the clearest association between suicid e and
any of the study variables was with mental disorder – 91%.”186 Additionally, it has been suggested
that “virtually all mental disorders have an increased risk of suicide except mental retardation and
possibly dementia and agoraphobia.”187 A suicide attempt is also significantly more likely to be
successful if attempted with a gun rather than by other means.188 This evidence indicates that
prohibiting individuals with histories of involuntary commitment for mental health treatment is a
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reasonable fit for achieving the goal of reducing suicide rates, particularly because determining
when someone has truly been rehabilitated from mental illness is a difficult task to undertake.
In relation to the government’s other interest⎯reducing gun violence⎯a prominent point
of criticism is that connecting mental illness and violence hardens the public to individuals
suffering from mental illness.189 It would be very difficult to argue that there is no stigmatizing
effect of § 922(g)(4); however, in Mai, the Ninth Circuit attempted to circumvents this issue to
some extent by pushing the analysis away from the hot top of gun violence and refocusing the
analysis on suicide risks. After all, under intermediate scrutiny, if a court is able to sufficiently
connect one of the government’s interests to the challenged law, it need not connect all of them.
Furthermore, a relevant area of empirical study that is not discussed by the courts is the
ability of health professionals to determine when someone has recovered from a mental illness and
what danger they pose, if any, to themselves and others. This is significant because it indicates
the likelihood that a second judicial hearing would be successful in determining the fitness of an
individual, previously involuntarily committed, for firearm possession.

Where an expert’s

testimony or medical examinations are used to attest to an individual’s rehabilitation since an
involuntary institutionalization, it is important for the court to know accurate information.
Particularly where relief involves the legal grant of access to a dangerous weapon, courts should
be certain that the individual has no lingering symptoms of mental illness. Yet, it is widely
accepted that physicians cannot, with good certainty, predict individual behavior because of the
broad spectrum of mental illness. While they may be able to speak generally about specific groups,
predicting one person’s individual behavior is unlikely. 190
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Although “neuroprotection⎯‘or the belief that one can predict individual behavior from
neuroscientific data’⎯is becoming increasingly

popular in United States courtrooms,

neuroscientists have yet to develop a sufficient understanding of the cause of many serious mental
health issues.”191 This is often used as an argument against banning the mentally ill from firearm
possession; however, the argument can easily be reversed. Where there is no certain way to
determine that someone who was afforded due process and adjudicated dangerous is now no longer
a danger, individual liberties may have to suffer in order to protect the public at large.192 This
approach is also in line with intermediate scrutiny, as intermediate scrutiny allows for some underand-overinclusiveness.
D. Importance of Recognizing Congressional Authority
Under intermediate scrutiny, Congress does not need to draft its laws in the least restrictive
way possible.193 Accordingly, to uphold a challenged law, a court must only determine that
Congress’s objectives would be achieved less efficiently without that law. 194 This means that in
Mai and Tyler, the government needed only to show that restricting individuals previously
involuntary committed from possessing firearms was substantially related to its goals of reducing
gun violence or suicide; it did not need to show that this was the only way to achieve its goals.
Furthermore, where empirical or medical evidence is arguably scarce, the Supreme Court has ruled
that in certain cases, it is proper to show deference to the legislature. For example, in Turner
Broadcasting System v. FCC, the Court determined that “sound policy making often required
legislators to forecast future events and to anticipate the likely impact of these events based on
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deductions and inferences for which complete empirical support may be unavailable.” 195 In
showing “substantial deference to the predictive judgments of Congress,” courts certainly do not
need to abandon judicial review altogether; however, the Court defined the judiciary’s role as
“assur[ing] that, in formulating its judgments, Congress has drawn reasonable inferences based on
substantial evidence.”196
The Sixth Circuit deviated from these principles when it determined that the government
had not carried its burden of reasonably linking § 922(g)(4) to its goals. In both Mai and Tyler,
the government presented evidence that the risk for suicide was thirty-nine times higher for people
who have been previously committed than not. 197 In Tyler, the Sixth Circuit determined that this
evidence was insufficient because the study ultimately concluded that the risk of suicide was
greatest shortly following commitment and diminished thereafter.198 Yet, in doing so, it seems
that the court either applied a stricter level of scrutiny than intermediate or it failed to recognize
that a diminished risk is not a dissolved risk. Likewise, the Sixth Circuit rejected the government’s
evidence determining that using a firearm substantially increases the risk that a suicide attempt
will be successful and its evidence that “relapse and readmission are common following and initial
commitment.”199
In contrast, the Mai Court determined that the studies reasonably supported the
congressional judgment despite their temporal limitations, reasoning that nothing suggested that
the risks posed disappeared entirely overtime, even if they decreased. 200 This approach is more in
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line with showing “substantial deference to the predictive judgments of Congress.” 201 And where
the outcome could be death or serious bodily injury, it seems particularly important to show this
deference.
VI. Conclusion
As rates of gun violence and suicide continue to increase, it is of paramount importance
that a uniformed approach to § 922(g)(4) constitutional challenges is established. Although there
are unfortunate consequences that can result from a categorical ban on firearm possession,
preventing suicide and reducing gun violence are compelling congressional interests that can be
reasonably tied to § 922(g)(4)’s prohibition of firearm possession by individuals previously
involuntarily committed to a mental health facility. Because the government need not show a
perfectly tailored fit under intermediate scrutiny, the government overcame its burden, and Mai v.
United States was correctly decided. Accordingly, should it grant review of this growing issue,
the Supreme Court should adopt the Ninth Circuit’s analysis to as-applied challenges to §
922(g)(4).
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